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1. The argument1 
 
In most countries public sector employment relations have traditionally been regulated by special 
rules and institutions, separate and distinct from those governing private sector employent relations. 
The reasons for this distinctiveness are rooted, according to many scholars, in the unique role of the 
state as employer and as service provider, and in a number of structural factors which on average give 
public employees and trade unions a stronger bargaining power than private sector employees and 
unions. 
Since the mid-late 1980s public service employment relations have undergone in many countries a 
continuous process of transformation, often within a context of public administration reform inspired 
by the New Public Management approach. The traditional distinctiveness of public service 
employment relations, with separate institutions and practices from the private sector, has been 
challenged, although to varying degrees and with different effects across countries. Based on the new 
institutional economics (transaction costs theory and agency theory), NPM aimed at removing any 
difference between the private and public sector as the only way to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of public service. Changing the traditional patterns of public sector employment 
relations and HRM practices was an essential part of this program. The promise was a fundamental 
transformation, with a double process of convergence: between different countries and between 
public and private sectors within each country. However, after more than two decades of NPM 
inspired reforms, these processes of convergence did not occur, if not to a limited extent. In many 
cases, the naïve adoption into the public sector of private sector institutions and practices brought 
about unintended and even perverse effects, rather than improved quality and lower costs. The 
fundamental transformation which NPM promised did not materialize, quite defferently from what 
occurred in private sector employment relations approximately in the same period.   
However, in many advanced countries, but also in some emerging economies, the 2008 crisis altered 
the picture in a crucial feature. Namely, it challenged the traditional configuration of public sector 
employment relations as sheltered from international market pressures and supranational actors, 
operating in a relatively closed environment mostly shaped by the regulatory power of the state and 
other domestic actors. The key effect of this greater role of external and international forces is to 
                                                          
1 In preparing this paper I greatly benefited of previous work I have done on public sector employment relations with 
other colleagues, and in particular with Stephen Bach, with whom the collaboration goes back to the 1990s. I am very 
grateful also for his comments to this paper, although the responsibility for what is written is mine.  
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strengthen governments in their relations with unions and employees, possibly altering the traditional 
balance of powers in public sector employment relations like globalization and the intensified 
competition did four in management’s favour in the private sector in recent decades. 
These changes in the traditional environment of public sector employment relations do not appear to 
be just transitory, but seem likely to last over time, at least in the medium term. Whether they will be 
strong enough to bring about the fundamental transformation of public sector employment relations 
that NPM promised but failed to deliver,  remains to be seen. Much will depend on the evolution of 
the crisis itself, and on the responses to the crisis by international authorities and national 
governments.    
 
2. The past: the traditional distinctiveness of public service employement relations 
In the first decades after the end of the Second World War, public service employment relations were 
characterized in most countries by distinctive  institutional, and often legal, features compared with 
employment relations in the private sector.  
In Europe, this separate regulation was particularly pronounced in countries with a Rechtsstaat 
tradition, either of Napoleonic or Prussian origin (Kickert 2007 and 2008; Clauwaert and Warneck 
2008; Bordogna 2008; Peters 2010; Bordogna and Pedersini 2013a), like France, Belgium, Italy, 
Spain, on the one side, and Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, among others, on the other side. But 
it was also evident within the common law tradition of the British/UK experience, although in 
different forms.  
In the first group of countries, such distinctiveness often implied a public law statute for all or a 
significant part of public employees, not only civil servants, subject to administrative law and 
administrative courts. Within this tradition, despite considerable differences across countries (for 
instance between France and Germany), a basic feature was the primacy of the law, whereby laws 
and regulations were the exclusive source of administrative action and the tasks of administration 
were mainly restricted to executing legislation and administering regulations based on the law 
(Kickert 2007: 28-9). Linked to this strongly legalistic conception was a body of state officials whose 
tasks were to fulfil sovereign functions on behalf of the authority of the state (external defence, 
internal order, administration of justice, administration of taxes). Within such a framework, it was 
hardly conceivable that these functionaries could have ‘particular’ interests in contrast with the 
general interest of the state of which they were servants. Hence a distinctive model of employment 
regulation derived, separated from that prevailing in the private sector and characterized by two 
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essential elements. On one hand, they were denied the collective bargaining rights (and at times also 
the right to strike and the right of association), in favour of the unilateral regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment through laws or administrative measures. On the other hand, they enjoyed 
a special employment status consisting of various substantive and procedural prerogatives, in terms 
of recruitment procedures, employment security, career path based on seniority, pension treatments, 
and other guarantees. In case of controversies, their regulation was subject to administrative law and 
administrative tribunals rather than to civil code and ordinary courts. The employment relations 
approach linked to this framework is often labelled in the literature as the ‘sovereign employer 
model’, to stress the unilateralism that characterized it (Beaumont 1992; Bach and Kessler 2007; 
Bordogna 2008).  
By contrast, within the common law framework of the British/UK experience, the absence of any 
distinction between administrative law and civil code and no clear legal demarcation between the 
private and the public sector of employment (Winchester and Bach 1999) prevented almost by 
definition a public law statute for public employees, leaving room to a tradition of joint regulation of 
terms and conditions of employment, in contrast to unilateralism.  However, despite this, even in this 
experience public service employment relations followed for decades a different pattern from that 
prevailing in the private sector. So much so that this pattern was (and is) often summarized as the 
“model employer” approach, to stress the generally more ‘benign’ attitude of the employer towards 
the employees and trade unions than in the private sector.   
Such a distinctiveness of public service employment relations, in whatever version (sovereign 
employer or model employer-like approach, or other variants as well), is detectable also in many 
countries outside Europe, both in advanced and mature economies and in emerging countries, from 
the US (especially in the federal government, but not only) to Japan, from Canada to Australia and 
New Zealand, from India to China, South Africa, Brazil and other Latin American countries (Katz, 
Kochan and Colvin 2015: ch. 10; OECD 2015: ch. 8; OECD 2008: ch. 2, although stressing how 
these special rules can be an impediment to the development of an efficient and service-oriented 
administration [p. 20]; ILO 2013: para 27; Dell’Aringa, Della Rocca and Keller 2001; Treu 1997). 
The reasons of this peculiarity are well known. They are mostly due to the basic features of the public 
sector employer. As it has been also recently underlined, “the public sector is in some ways 
fundamentally different from the private sector” since “government is not just an employer […]: it is 
a provider of public services and the public sector is affected more significantly than the private sector 
by political pressures and the demands of the public” (Katz, Kochan and Colvin 2015: ch. 10; also 
2008: ch. 13). These considerations are consistent with a long-standing line of analysis which stresses 
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the unique role of the state as employer and the particular context in which the public employer 
operates (Kochan 1974; Ferner 1985; Beaumont 1992). Public sector organizations are mainly 
financed through public funds, are subject to a higher degree of public scrutiny, their 
employers/managers are sensitive to the need for political consensus, and are answerable to a wider 
range of stakeholders than in private sector organizations (Bach and Kessler, 2007). It follows from 
this that the public employer is a political institution exposed to a context that leads to a logic of 
action which is different from that prevailing in the private sector: a political dimension is an intrinsic 
feature of public sector industrial relations, to some extent irreducible (Bordogna 2008).  
Katz, Kochan and Colvin (2015: ch. 10; also Katz 2013: 1034-1036) also stress how the Marshall’s 
conditions operate differently in the public and the private sectors. On average, two of these 
conditions (substitutability of employees with other factors of production; price elasticity of demand 
for the final good) give public employees a stronger bargaining power than private employees, one 
condition is neutral and the last one is likely to be at a disadvantage (the importance of being 
unimportant). This implies that, irrespective of the legal regulation of the employment relationship 
and irrespective of the prevailing employment relations model, public employees, despite significant 
differences across countries and over time, would on average enjoy a stronger bargaining power than 
private sector employees – which according to many scholars is one of the reasons ‘justifying’ a 
special regulation of employment relations in the public sector2. 
 
3. The challenge of two decades of NPM-inspired reforms 
It is precisely such distinctiveness of public sector employment relations that, about three decades 
ago, started to be challenged by the cycle of public service reforms inspired by the new public 
management (NPM) approach, within a wider process of public sector restructuring. This cycle 
originated around the mid-1980s in the main Anglophone countries (UK, US, Australia and New 
Zealand) but, with the support of OECD (1995), soon spread well beyond the ‘first movers’ to invest, 
although to a different degree, the organization of public administration in many countries all over 
the world, irrespective of the political complexion of the party in office (Hood 1995: 100; OECD 
2008: ch. 2; 2015: ch. 8). 
Although, despite the vastness of the relevant literature, NPM still remains a loose and often ill-
defined concept, central to its programme was the idea that the only or best way to improve the 
                                                          
2 A partially different position would be to consider the traditional private sector employment relations institutions 
appropriate also for the public sector, but in a form adapted to meet the special circumstances of the public setcor 
(Katz, Kochan and Colvin 2015: ch 10).  
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efficiency and effectiveness of public services was by lessening or removing any difference between 
the public and the private sectors3. Rooted as it was in the new institutional economics  – especially 
public choice theory, transaction cost theory and agency theory –  the essential components of its 
recipes were the adoption of market-oriented mechanisms of governance in conjunction with private 
sector management techniques. Privatization and marketization were the two keywords:  the first one 
to indicate the necessity of re-designing the boundaries between the private and public sector of the 
economy, and the second one to stress the need to shift the internal governance of public organizations 
from a Weberian bureaucratic model, based on formal rules, hierarchical relations and process 
accountability, towards a marked-like model including contract-based (or quasi-contract) 
relationships, incentives and accountability on results. Thus, NPM-inspired reforms aimed to modify 
profoundly the system of constraints and opportunities, of incentives and controls governing the entire 
functioning of the public services, and to reduce the differences between the public and the private 
sectors by importing into the former the methods of management typical of the latter – a presumed 
paradigm shift in the organization and management of public administration (Dunleavy and Hood 
1994). Moreover, given  the claim to universality inherent to its programme (Hood 1991: 8; Hood 
1995: 95), NPM justified the expectation of a process of global convergence, conceiving any variation 
across countries only in terms of leaders and laggards, not in terms of the direction of change (Bach 
and Bordogna 2011: 2282).  
In particular, with regard to employment relations, HRM practices and the role of trade unions, NPM 
challenged both the approaches that dominated public service employment regulation in the post-
WWII period. With regard to the ‘sovereign employer’ approach, under attack were the special 
employment status of public employees, especially but not only civil servants, and the substantive 
guarantees and prerogatives attached to such a status. Against the ‘model employer’ approach the 
targets were the full recognition of IR institutions and the prejudicially benign attitude towards union 
prerogatives. Against both approaches, NPM preached less attention to equity issues and national 
comparability standards, and the replacement of automatic and collective mechanisms of pay 
increases and career promotion with more discretionary, selective and variable mechanisms (such as 
performance related pay, merit pay, variable bonuses, etc.). A double process of convergence could 
be therefore predicted with regard to employment relations: between public and private sector within 
each country, and in public sector between different countries. 
                                                          
3 It is possible to find in the literature many specifications of the core components of NPM, for example in Hood (1991 
and 1995), Dunleavy and Hood (1994), OECD (2012: ch. 3, box 3.1). The list can be slightly different, the substance is 
the same.  
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As it is known, developments in many OECD countries turned out to be much more mixed and 
diversified than rather naïvely predicted, with significant variations across different countries, in 
different segments of the public sector and in different parts of the NPM programme (Bordogna 2008: 
386-87). Despite some undeniable evidence in the convergence both between countries, for instance 
as effect of privatization and outsourcing of formerly publicly provided services, and between public 
and private sector within each country, for instance as effect of processes of de-bureacratization, 
marketization, decentralization and performance budgeting that almost everywhere took place, the 
argument of a radical turnaround or a paradigm shift is untenable. Rather than the prediction of a 
universal and linear process of change of all or most countries towards a common destination, with a 
distinction only between leaders and laggards, or even the more nuanced hypothesis of varieties of 
NPM, the idea of alternative reform trajectories is more pertinent and realistic. Trajectories in which 
layers of reform accumulate over time combining elements of NPM with long-standing features of 
the ‘classic’ public administration, as well as other measures, giving rise to distinctive, partially 
country-specific and institutionally embedded patterns of administrative reform, comprising, in 
addition to NPM, forms of neo-Weberian state and hybrid models of governance (Pollitt 2007; 
Christensen and Lægreid 2007 and 2009; Bach and Bordogna 2011).    
With reference in particular to employment relations and HRM practices, neither a radical 
convergence between countries nor between public and private sector in each country has occurred, 
although with some exception. In Europe and in many developed market economies, despite some 
common trends, the clusters of countries that pre-existed NPM reforms have not been substantially 
altered by them, or only limitedly. The reason is that in the public sector country-specific legal, 
institutional and administrative traditions are particularly strong, resulting in national path 
dependencies which hinder or prevent marked processes of convergence (Bordogna 2008). Also the 
convergence with the private sector has been limited. In many OECD countries, as well as in emerging 
ones, despite the weakening of some of their special guarantees and prerogatives, the persistent 
difference of status of public employees (OECD 2015a; Katz, Kochan and Colvin 2015, ch 8; ILO 
2013) still affects many features of public sector employment relations. The unique role of the state 
as employer, and the particular context in which the public employer operates, have proven to be 
more resistant than it was naïvely assumed by the NPM programme, preventing a full convergence 
with private sector employment relations. Not only. The neglect of this distinctive feature of the 
public employer, together with the obsessive concern with agency costs and the problem of agents’ 
opportunism, has led in many cases to the inability to see the difficulties of importing into the public 
sector market-oriented mechanisms of governance and private sector management techniques, and, 
more important, to anticipate the unintended or perverse effects of NPM inspired reforms (Bordogna 
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2008). With regard to employment relations and HRM practices, this has been the case, for instance, 
of the of the decentralization of collective bargaining over pay and conditions of employment,  the 
replacement of automatic and ‘collectivist’ of pay increases and career promotion linked to the length 
of service with more discretionary and selective procedures, and forms of PRP and individualization 
of employment conditions. When these types of  measures have been imported from the private sector 
neglecting the peculiarities of the public employer and without the appropriate financial and 
institutional conditions, the effects have often been quite distant, if not opposed, to those obtained in 
the private sector. This has been stressed also by OECD studies in the first decade of the new 
millennium (in particular 2007a and 2007b, but also 2005 and 2008), amending the more enthusiastic, 
and somewhat naïve, support of NPM of previous years. A much more cautious and conscious attitude 
towards NPM is clearly prevailing in recent times (OECD 2010, 2012, 2015a) 4.   
It can be concluded, therefore, that the fundamental change, or paradigm shift, promised by the NPM 
approach in the organization and management of public administration, including public service 
employment relations, did not materialize. Certainly not with the magnitude and depth that many 
observers expected. Which does not mean that NPM is dead (de Vries 2010) or that none of its 
components may be fruitfully imported into the public sector and public service employment 
relations. But means that even on the part of institutions that strongly supported NPM as the most 
appropriate way to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public services there is a greater 
acknowledgement of the pros and cons of its recipes, of their potential unintended and even perverse 
effects, and of the institutional conditions which help avoid them. 
  
4. The 2008 crisis and its effects: again no fundamental change? 
The conclusions of the previous section are consistent, with some qualification, with those reached 
in a recent article by H. Katz (2013). Although referred to the U.S. experience and with no explicit 
mention to NPM reforms, the question raised by the author is pertinent to our topic. The issue is 
whether U.S. public sector (state and local government) labor relations have seen over the last three 
decades a ‘fundamental transformation’ like the transformation that occurred in the 1980s in the 
private sector, as documented by Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986). Katz’s answer is negative.  
The argument supporting a radical change in the private sector since the early 1980s was based on a 
shift in bargaining power in management’s favour due to four main factors: increased international 
                                                          
4 In 2010 the OECD launched a new series of studies on “new reforms and reform trends in public administration” 
under the title of Value for Money in Government. The first report of the series had the significant title of Public 
Administration after ‘New Public Management’.  
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competition, growth of a highly competitive domestic non-union sector, severe economic recession, 
deregulation in a number of key industries. The effect of these factors was to pressure “private sector 
unions into concessions and other related bargaining outcome and process changes” (ibidem: 1036). 
In contrast with the private sector experience, the argument continues, the influence of these 
economic factors in the public sector seems “much more modest” than it was in the private sector. 
The role of international sourcing and of multinational corporations is limited, while privatization 
processes, which make alternative providers more feasible, therefore weakening unions’ bargaining 
power, have expanded only gradually since the early 1990s in the US experience, and their increase 
in recent years has not been on the scale capable to lead to transformative change (ibidem: 1037). 
Also regulatory changes in the public sector have been limited compared to the deep deregulation 
that took place in some private sector industries in the 1980s (trucking, airlines, telecommunications). 
All in all, these differences in the two contexts would explain why the fundamental transformation 
that occurred in the U.S. private sector did not affect, and is not affecting, public sector labour 
relations.  
Some of the factors mentioned by Katz to justify his conclusion are specific of the U.S. and have no 
explicit link with NPM reforms. But the question he raises has a more general value, not limited to 
the U.S. experience, and some core components of the NPM program – like the privatization and 
outsourcing of public services, the promotion of competition and user’s choice, the adoption of 
market-like mechanisms of governance – resemble the factors that play a crucial role in his analysis. 
Thus, the question he raises is pertinent to our topic. 
As already noticed, in the previous sections we arrived to similar conclusions. Approximately in the 
same period analysed by Kochan, Katz and McKersie, the fundamental change promised by the NPM 
program in public service employment relations, within a wider restructuring of public 
administration, did not materialize. The distinctiveness of public service employment relations, 
challenged by NPM, has probably been partly eroded, at least in some feature and especially in some 
countries; but after more than two decades of NPM-inspired reform it has not been substantially 
altered. 
The question is now whether this conclusion is tenable also in the light of the economic and financial 
crisis exploded in 2008. The crisis, and governments’ responses to it,  have not only heavily affected 
public sector working conditions in many countries, including employment levels, salary increases 
and pension benefits, but have also strained the consolidated regulatory patterns of employment 
relations, especially, but not only, in Europe (Bach and Pedersini 2013; Bach and Bordogna 2013; 
Vaughan-Whitehead 2013; Kickert, Randma-Liiv and Savi 2013). Are the effects of the crisis only 
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transitory, unable to bring about a fundamental transformation? Or will they have a more profound 
and lasting impact? What is their relationship with the NPM program? Will they weaken or strengthen 
the distinctiveness of public service employment relations? 
Probably the most important change, influencing several others, is that the crisis has challenged the 
traditional configuration of public sector employment relations as sheltered from international market 
pressures, operating in a relatively closed environment mostly shaped by the regulatory power of the 
state and other domestic actors (Bach and Bordogna 2013: 291-92). External forces, especially 
international financial markets, together with supranational actors (IMF; European Commission in 
the European Union, others) have powerfully entered into the scene, playing a key role in constraining 
government responses to the crisis. This has had major consequences for public sector employment 
relations, among which a strong revival of unilateralism and a process of  recentralization of pay 
determination5. The relationships of these consequences with the NPM program are ambivalent. On 
the one hand, they represent a break with the cycle of NPM-inspired reforms. What is probably the 
main distinctive feature of public sector employment relations, namely the power of public employers 
to determine terms and conditions of public employees unilaterally, has been reaffirmed and possibly 
further strengthened by the crisis, also influencing the dynamics related to public employees under 
private contract and, in some cases, to private sector employees. On the other hand, these prerogatives 
have often been used to achieve a leaner public sector and accelerate the introduction into the public 
sector of HRM practices and managerial techniques typical of the private sector (Bach and Bordogna 
2013; for the impact of the crisis on NPM reforms see also OECD 2010, 2012, 2015a). 
These considerations apart, one may agree that the pressures played by the increased role of 
international forces and supranational actors in the public sector are different from those exerted in 
the private sector by the intensified international competition and the growth of a competitive non-
union sector – after all, unilaterally decided cuts in replacement ratios or wage freezes are different 
from massive dismissals or firms bankruptcy. But public budget constraints are an increasing problem 
all over the world, and, as stressed in Katz analysis (2013; also Katz, Kochan and Colvin 2015: ch. 
10), this is a crucial variable conditioning public sector employment relations. There can be cross-
national variations in the impact of this variable, depending on the financial vulnerability of the 
relevant country (Lodge and Hood 2012). But the key point is that such a greater role of international 
forces and supranational actors strengthens governments position in their relations with public 
                                                          
5 In countries where the ‘sovereign employment’ model already gave the employer the power to unilaterally 
determine terms and conditions of employment, this power has been fully exploited; in countries with a 
‘model employer’ approach, collective bargaining rights have been often suspended or cancelled. 
Recentralization has often been linked to centrally defined, horizontal measures applied in a generalized and 
undifferentiated way to all services and all employees.  
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employees and trade unions, possibly altering the traditional balance of powers in the public sector 
like the four factors analysed by Kochan, Katz and McKersie did in management’s favour in the 
private sector. Although public sector unions remain the stronghold of trade union movements in 
most countries (Visser 2011 and 2015; Pedersini 2014), their role has generally been weakened by 
the crisis, if not in membership and density, certainly in their capacity to influence governments’ and 
public employers’ policies: their veto powers are certainly weaker than in the sheltered environment 
of the past (Bach and Bordogna 2013). And this capacity is one of the feature at the basis of the 
traditional peculiarity of public sector employment relations (Katz, Kochan, Colvin 2015: ch. 10). 
If these changes are significant enough to bring about a fundamental transformation of public sector 
employment relations remains to be seen. But after more than seven years since the beginning of the 
crisis we can say that they are not just transitory changes. Their effects are there to last, at least in the 
middle term. 
  
5. Summary and future prospects 
In the standard industrial relations literature, public service employment relations are traditionally 
dealt with in a separate chapter. Also in the ILERA World and Regional Congresses there is almost 
always a special track dedicated to the public sector. This feature reflects the fact that in virtually all 
countries the laws and institutions regulating public sector employment relations are different and 
separated from those prevailing in the private sector. This, in turn, is linked to some structural 
peculiarities of the public sector, to begin with the unique role of the state as employer and provider 
of public services, which gives public service employment relations an inherent political dimension, 
to some extent irriducible.  In such a context, more ‘politicized’ and less exposed to international 
market pressures, public sector employees and trade unions would enjoy an advantage compared with 
private sector employees and unions due to a lower price elasticity of demand of public services and 
a lower substitutability of public employees.    
All these combined factors concur to determine the traditional distinctiveness of public service 
employment relations, with separate institutions and practices from the private sector. A feature which 
characterizes, despite their differences, both the approaches traditionally dominating public sector 
employment relations – the ‘sovereign employer’ approach and the ‘model employer’ approach. 
Such a distinctiveness started to be under attack about three decades ago, as effect of the new public 
management (NPM)  program to reform the entire public administration by removing any difference 
between the private and public sector. Within a wider porogram of public sector restructuring based 
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on massive privatization and marketization processes, with regard to employment relations NPM  
challenged the main features of both approaches that dominated public sector employment regulation 
in the first decades after WWII. Against the sovereign empoyer model,  under attack was the special 
status of civil servants and public employees in general, with the procedural and substantive 
guarantees attached to it. Against the model employer approach, the targets were the full recognition 
of IR institutions and the prejudicially benign attitude towards union prerogatives. And against both 
approaches, NPM promoted less attention to equity issues and national comparability standards, and 
the replacement of automatic and collective mechanisms of pay increases and career promotion with 
more discretionary, selective and variable mechanisms. A double process of convergence was 
therefore expected with regard to employment relations: between public and private sector within 
each country, and in public sector between different countries. 
After more than two decades of NPM-inspired reform attempts in many countries, these expectations 
of double convergence did not materialized, if not to a limited extent. Rather than a linear move of 
all countries along the common path indicated by the NPM program and towards the unique model 
promoted by it, with countries differentiated only between leaders and laggards, different models 
have emerged linked to country specific legal and institutional traditions. With regard to the 
convergence between private and public sector, the structural factors characterizing public service 
employment relations and underpinning their distinctiveness – underlined both in the Ferner and 
Baumont tradition and in the Katz and Kochan version – have proved to be much more resistant than 
expected by NPM. The radical change promised by the NPM program has not occurred, quite 
differently from the ‘fundamental transformation’ which in the same period characterized private 
sector employment relations, first of all in the United States but in other countries as well, under the 
pressure of intensified international and domestic competition, liberalization and deregulation 
processes. 
The financial and economic crisis exploded in 2008, followed in many countries by a sovereign debt 
crisis, seem however to bring some significant change into the picture.  Most important, has 
undermined the traditional configuration of public sector employment relations as sheltered from 
international market pressures and operating in a relatively closed environment shaped by the 
regulatory power of the state and other domestic actors. International forces, namely financial 
markets, and supranational actors have powerfully entered into the scene, playing a key role in 
constraining government responses to the crisis, with major consequences on public service 
employment relations. Public budget constraints are an increasingly important problem for many 
countries. The key point is that these changes strengthen governments position in their relations with 
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public employees and trade unions, possibly altering the traditional balance of powers in the public 
sector like the four factors analysed by Kochan, Katz and McKersie did in management’s favour in 
the private sector. 
These effects of the crisis do not seem to be transitory, but are likely to endure at least in the middle 
term. Whether they will be significant enough to bring about a fundamental change in public sector 
employment relations similar to the transformation that occurred in the private sector, accomplishing 
what NPM failed to obtain, remains to be seen. Much will depend on the evolution of the crisis itself. 
Whatever these developments, at least two issues are likely to remain on the agenda of public service 
employment relations with a greater urgency than in the private sector. One is the traditional issue of 
the regulation of labour disputes in public services, especially when the exercise of the right to strike 
of employees threatens the fruition of the constitutionally protected rights of the person (to security, 
health, mobility, information, education, etc.). This problem is particularly delicate in countries, like 
France and Italy in Europe, where also the right to strike is constitutionally protected, with no 
substantial distinction between private and public employees (by the way, many public services are 
supplied by private providers, with employees under private employment contract). But it is emerging 
in an important way also in countries where the potential conflict between two constitutionally 
protected rights does not exist, and where the general institutions of the industrial relations system 
were traditionally able to keep the problem under control (like in Germany, to take another European 
example). The problem of course consists in the circumstance that in this type of conflicts third actors 
are inevitably affected (patients, commuters, students and their families, citizens at large) which do 
not have any responsibility in the dispute and which do not participate nor are represented in 
negotiations. Perhaps these conflicts are not increasing in absolute quantitative terms, but their role 
is crucial in contemporary economies and societies (Bordogna and Cella 2002; Bordogna 2010).   
The second issue is newer. It regards the role of service users (often union members) in public service 
employment relations. Until recently, this role has been traditionally neglected, both in practice and 
in the literature, with few exceptions. But it is emerging as an important issue in some recent 
comparative studies (Bach 2015), and perhaps could also offer an opportunity for a renewal, or 
revitalisation, of public service unions.  
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